

1. You hire someone to clean your house. This person desperately needs a job and has no other options at the moment. Because of this, you could easily get away with paying them less than they deserve for the work they have done. They would prefer getting paid less than they deserve over not having a job. You can easily afford to pay them what they deserve. Would it be morally permissible for you to pay them much less (but still enough for them to survive)?
  
2. This is a version of 1, but if you paid the person what they deserved, then you would not be able to pay for college. They prefer getting paid less than they deserve to having no job. Would it be morally permissible to hire them and pay them less than they deserve, but still enough for them to survive (and enough that you can continue to pay for college)?
  
3. Your next door neighbor, who is extremely wealthy, has also hired someone to clean their house. The person they hired also desperately needs a job, and has no other options at the moment. Your neighbor pays this person way less than they deserve for the work they have done. You still have the person working for you that you hired in 1, and they still desperately need that job (assume you are paying them what they deserve). You can afford to just give the neighbor's cleaning person extra money to make up for their low pay, or to hire them for work you don't really need done to make up for their low pay. This won't significantly harm you. Are you morally obligated to do so?

*an alleged obligation to x is too demanding (overdemanding):*

*an alleged obligation is unfair:*

*fair share:* Assume that all agents participate in some collective action; the amount each agent would have to participate for the goal to be met, given this full participation of all agents, is that agent's "fair share."

**The strong fairness argument**

- a. If an agent were obligated to do more than their fair share because other agents did not participate, then this would be an unfair moral obligation.
  - b. There are no unfair moral obligations (because unfairness is wrong?).
  - c. Thus, no agent is obligated to do more than their fair share because other agents do not participate in collective action.
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4. Susan is getting married in Forest Park, near the art museum. Ann, who hates weddings, throws a baby into the nearby pond. Susan is the only person who can swim at the wedding. Is she morally obligated to save the baby?
  5. Consider a modified version of 4. In this version, Susan is wearing a very expensive dress that she rented. Paying for the dress would have bankrupted her and ruined her financially for years to come, but it was extremely affordable to rent and is beautiful. The dress, like all good wedding dresses, would take hours to remove. Is she morally obligated to save the baby, even though doing so risks ruining her dress and bankrupting her?
  6. This is a modified version of 5. In this version, Ann hijacks a bus full of orphaned babies and crashes it into the pond near the museum. However, all the guests at the wedding can swim. Coincidentally, there is one orphan per guest. Susan realizes that none of her guests are going to help save the orphans from drowning. And every time she goes into the water, it increases the chances that her dress will be ruined beyond repair. How many orphans is she obligated to try to save?

**The moderate fairness argument**

- d. Some unfair “obligations” are not real moral obligations: these are unfair and have some additional feature  $x$  (but  $x$  by itself doesn’t make something not an obligation).
- e. If states were obligated to do more than their fair share in preventing climate change, this would be an unfair moral obligation with feature  $x$ .
- f. Thus, states are not obligated to do more than their fair share in preventing climate change.

**The special obligations argument**

7. Time passes. Susan gets married and has a baby. She takes her baby to the park. Ann has moved on to hating babies, and not just weddings. She grabs Susan's child and throws it into a far-away part of the pond. And the same time, she pushes two other babies (babies belonging to strangers) into the nearby part of the pond. Unfortunately, no one here can swim except Susan, and Susan knows that. Susan can either save her own baby or can save the two other babies (since they are next to each other), but can't do both. What is she obligated to do?
  - g. States have a *prima facie* obligation to not harm the citizens of other states.
  - h. States have a *prima facie* obligation to not harm their own citizens.
  - i. The state's duty to not harm their own citizens (usually) overrides the obligation to not harm the citizens of other states.
  - j. If a first world state does more than its fair share in preventing climate change, this harms the citizens of that state (more than if the state had done just its fair share).
  - k. Thus, it is morally wrong for states to do more than their fair share in preventing climate change.

**A worry about the special obligations argument**

- l. Animals, plants, and species are citizens of no states, nor does any state allow them to be citizens.
- m. There is something unjust about privileging one's own citizens over beings that are not protected or privileged by any state.
- n. Thus...